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Blade Runners: Speculations on
Narrative and Interactivity
~e 1998 release of Westwood Studio's Blade
Runner computer game offers a unique opportu-
nity to speculate on a key element of new media
forms: interactivity. There are two principal rea-
sons fill' this: first, the game may be compared to
the lilnl---or rather lillns--lln which it is based.
Ridley Scott's Blade Runner (1982) as well as the
"director's cut" released a decade later. Aside
from the promise of a comparison between film
and computer game for providing insight into
the differences between narrative and interactive
media forms, this exercise is particularly felici-
tous in the case of the Blade Runner films. Jean-
Francois Lyotard's influential proposition in The
Post modem Condition (first published in 1979)
regarding a dissolution of the legitimizing force
of the great narratives of European modernity-
those of universal emancipation, enlightenment,
and progress-precipitated a wider questioning
of the nature and Iuuction of narratives in the
formation of social structures and individual
identity.' /3/wie Rwltla has attracted considerable
critical interest in this regard as a film that imag-
ines (and images) a dystopian, postmodern near
future in which history has emptied out into a
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jumble of cultural, linguistic, and architectural fragments, and in which
individual identity is a tenuous proposition, never far removed from inde-
terminacy and illegitimacy.'
It is in this context of the widespread questioning of the forms and out-
comes of the project and progress of Western modernity that the discourse
has developed promoting the new media's superior modality of engagement
with and between individuals in the guise of interactivity. Discussion of the
benefits of interactivity over narrativity has tended to align itself with a para-
digm shift toward a post modern, posthuman situation in which pluralist
social formations and multiple identity options succeed modernist ideals of
national monocultural identity.'
This enthusiasm for interactivity leads me to my second principal reason
for examining the Blade Runner game. It has received a mixed reception
in the game-playing community that is indicative, I argue, of an internal
te-nsion in the game's adaptation of the film. This tension exists between
its interactive and narrative elements. While it has won praise from many
quarters (including picking up an Academy of Interactive Arts and Sciences
Award in the adventure game category), one hard-nosed game reviewer, Ron
Dulin, has criticized the Blade Runner game for failing to live up to its prom-
ise to revolutionize the adventure game genre.' It was promoted as "the first
real-time adventure game" that had "a constantly changing plot" peopled
with characters armed with sufficient artificial intelligence to make game
play unpredictable and highly responsive to player interaction.' These prom-
ises have not been fulfilled, according to Dulin, who argues quite correctly
that the game is too "automated" in terms of navigation, the occurrence of
key events, and the ability of the player to play with/in the interface.'
This criticism of the game as too automated is illuminating. It mobilizes
what is the key binary opposition structuring both mainstream and criti-
cal discourses on computer-mediated interactivity: that between freedom
and constraint. Interactivity is generally presumed to offer greater freedom
to the media user, who is no longer simply a passive recipient of broadcast
transmissions-no longer constrained by an inability to respond, alter, or
otherwise interact directly with the media text. Conventional narrative, with
its closed, linear, and predetermined form, is seen as the model instance of
constraint against which the new media struggle.'
Yet the notion of automation does not only involve the opposition of free-
dom and constraint. It also refers to the process of regulated mechanical
(re)production, of blind machinic repetition, a process whose polar opposite
is the human activity of crafting the handmade item. This polarity is Iunda-
mental to the analysis of the modern industrial age of mass reproduction.
and it can be seen in the film's narrative and figural preoccupations \\ ith
various forms of automatons, artificial organisms, and replicaurs. Ind'Tl!.
Blade Runna's parable of the btl' of btl' capitalist SO"il'l) r,'\ oh ,'S arou: id tl«
Nexus 6 replicants, "who" n-preseut a termiually unstable' In;Khillc'jhun,;ln
amalgam - "more human than human" is the Tyrell Corporat ion's motto Itll
the Nexus 6 cyborgs.
Automation, as a production method, does not allow lor humau inter
vention or interaction, except in the form of the controller. a veritable dellS
ex machina who prescribes the sequence of actions and who lIId) inte-r-
vene to halt or correct the course of events in exceptional circumstances,
In automated factory production systems the name of the mechanism for
this exterior control is thl' I'rogr;1I111Ilahl,' I.ogic Controller. As a product
at the forefront of interactive gaming, the Blade Runner game attempts to
minimize the influence of such prescription by transferring as much con-
trol as possible to the individual "interactor,' who manufactures the course
of events through his or her eye-hand interface with the screen. In its effort
to reproduce the design, ambience, and thematic significance of the film,
however, the game remains faithful to modes of narrativity and spectator
positioning that are commonly associated with the broadcast (onus of con-
ventional modern media. Examples of these modes include the following:
1. The game is divided into "acts," which begin and end with conned,
ing sequences that are "cut-scene" animations with no interactive de-
ment; the gamer can only watch these scene-setting transitions for
clues about the progress of the game's plot.
2. A predesigned narrative chain of events is just waiting to begin
regardless of tlu- llld(lidillg of other eYents ill the game s diegesis, For
example, some events that occur in the gallle, like the bombing of Iht'
Dermo Design laboratory on DNA Row ill act 2, take place only when
the player's third-person avatar, the blade runner Ray McCoy. enters
the building.
3- The sets have limited scope for interactivity: for ill stance, McCoy
has extremely limited options regarding both the clues he finds (he can
collect and sort them in a viewable database but do nothing else with
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them) and what he can do with his weapon (he cannot draw it out and
fire at anyone or any object, nor can he threaten "figures" with it).
The Blade Runner game, then, can be thought of as caught in a contradictory
position in its negotiation of the opposition between interactive liberty and
narrative prescription, a position that opens up the possibility of a critique
of this opposition. This opportunity is all the more advantageous for the cor-
respondences that exist between the computer game's intermediary posi-
tion and the thematic trajectory of the film it has replicated. As Scott Bukat-
man has pointed out in his British Film Institute monograph, BlucL~ Runna
is a film in which "the more we see, the more our uncertainly grows.'" It
presents a world in which visibility is increased through various techno-
logical means (overhead audiovisual surveillance, the Voigt-Kampff test of
minute facial reactions, the Esper photo analysis machine, the floating bill-
boards, etc.) but in which the reliability of what is seen is correspondingly
dec rc-ascd: Who is really hu man? Is Zhora's pet a real snake or an artifi-
cial onr- Are Deckard's photos real or simulated? This uncertainty parallels
and magnifies the ambiguity and ethical ambivalence of the narrative's epis-
temological project of determining who is human and who is not human
and, therefore, who should be killed and who should survive at the film's
conclusion.
Every stage of the game's replication of the film provides the chance to
speculate on the validity of the putative opposition between mechanical
repetition (narrative) and innovative creation (interactivity). To say that the
game replicates the film is, of course, already speculative in the sense I have
just described because the game is not intended to be an exact replica of
the film in the literal sense of a precise reproduction. It is nevertheless a
"replicaut" in the Tyrell Corporation's use of that term-a copy modeled on
an original that is designed to be superior to that original by exceeding its
capacities ("more human than human"). The game purports to be "more
Hluc/( RUlIlla than Biadc Runner" in that it not only provides the ambience,
technologies, and scenarios of the film, but also, through interactive design,
immerses the gamer inside the Blad~ Runner milieu with all of its episte-
mological traps and ethical doubts.
The film's speculation about whether the blade runner who hunts the
replicants is himself a replicant also plays a decisive part in the various nar-
rative branches of the game's multilinear story structure. In some of its
alternative trajectories the gamer's avatar McCoy tunis (Jut to b•..a r•..plicant
and finds himself being hunte-d ~doug witl: thl' repli"llll~ he' I\~I~~"l'klng
to "retire." Indeed, the interactor can influence this narrat iv« turn of t'I"lIts
through his or her initial behavior toward tlie n-plicauts lwing ill\t'~tig~ltt"!.
The identity of the detc-c t ivr is ~ICl'nlral issue of tln- tilm's int<:III'gJtion elf
the nature of humanity in an age of sophisticated tedulological rcpro.lu,
tion and simulation. The ganle incorporates this spcrul.u iou as In adilt'
element of game play by putting McCoy's identity itsc-lf into playas a kq
variable in cakulating how the g~nlle's t'Vt'nl~ unfold."
In doing so the gamC' themat izes what David Rokeby has desnilwd as
the reflexive nature of iutcractivc u-clmology and tt'chuology more gent'r-
ally. For Rokeby, "a technology is interactive to the ch'gree that it reflects
the consequence's of our actions or decisions back to us," so that all inter-
active technology is a "mirror" ofsorts.'''This mirror i~ not purdy rdh-ctile
in that it dOl'S not olily giVl' hack a siruph- sl'if-illiagt' to tlu- hum.ur II,,'L It
also ",.(ji'llds what it is givl'lI; what is rdlllllt·d is ourse-lves. t Iall,!ollnt'd .rud
processed."!' For Rokeby, a critical understanding of intcractivc- ll'dlilOlogl
should be sought via exploration of the dialectic between the refleclilt, alld
refractive instances of the techllologicalnlirror. that is, lx-tween the mirror-
ing of the user and the transformative impact of technological mediation
that "provides us with a ,ens" oltlu- relat ion IwtWt'C'l1this selfand Ihe- expc-ri-
enced worhl."!:' The Blade Runner game otlc-rs itse-l! 10 lust such a ,klh-ct i, al
exploration through irs structuring of gaUlt' play so that tlu- iuteractor nlay
or may not be a nonhuman. replicant cyborg depending ou thcir iuu-r.r.t ious
with the ganlt' world."
If the game is a mirror, the-n it provides the opportunity lor specula-
tion on the nature ofthe hUln~ln/ll'chnology relationship and the pote-ut ial
of interactive media to de-liver WI',Ill'r frt't'dOin atlll'Tt'atility to th" Indi-
vidual subject. But as Jacques Derrida cautions, all speculation is a galllbk
because in its mirroring ofother acts and interactions, speculative discourse
arrives at a constitutive uncertainty as to its own identity vis-a-vis that 011
which it speculates." Given the risky nature of this venture, one that I would
argue against Rokeby cannot be rendered completely secure by recourse to
Hegelian dialectics, but that nevertheless is concerned crucially with the
oppositional structure foundational to Hegelian philosophy -that of the self
(the human subject) and th« objective, nonhuman [technological) other>
I offer these necessarily chancy speculations on the nature of interactivity,
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borrowing from Blade Runners in the hope of profiting from the reflective
venture.
To initiate this venture I first want to consider the rhetoric of computer
mediated interactivity by recalling briefly the history of the development
of computer interfaces. This will enable me to highlight the central role
the figure of the child played in the influential discourse that promoted
computer-mediated interactivity.
In his account of the progress of virtual reality technologies, Howard
Rheingold describes the influential work done by Seymour Papert in the late
1960s and 1970S at the MIT Artificial Intelligence Laboratory on making
computers accessible to children." Through the person of Alan Kay, a stu-
dent of Papert's, this orientation of interface development fed into the work
done at Xerox's famous Palo Alto Research Center (PARC) in the 1970s.
PARC assembled the research team responsible for inventing the basic com-
ponents of the graphical user interface or GUI (mouse, icon-based inter-
face). The PARC team used children to test whether their experimental
interface designs were effective.
In his book Mindstorms: Children, Computers and Powerful Ideas, Papert
states that two major themes have shaped his research agenda, namely "that
children can learn to use computers in a masterful way, and that learning
to use computers can change the way they learn everything else."> Writing
in 1980, Papert acknowledged the influence on his work of the theories of
French psychologist Jean Piaget concerning children as "builders of their
own intellectual structures."" This notion informed Papert's own aspira-
tions regarding the incorporation of computing in the education system:
In many schools today, the phrase "computer-aided instruction" means
making the computer teach the child. One might say the computer is
beillg used to program the child. In my vision, the child programs the com-
puter, and, in doing so, both acquires a sense of mastery over a piece of
the most modern and powerful technology and establishes an intimate
contact with some of the deepest ideas from science, mathematics, and
from the art of intellectual model building."
Mastery over modern technology for the child, and, in time, for all humans
is Papert's influential vision for computing. It is presumed achievable
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through the transformation of computers from instrumental, noncommu-
nicative adjuncts to established modes ofk-arning to responsive, pl:ogram-
mable, interactive model-building machines, the building blocks of tomor-
row's "computational cultures.":" Beyond (or beneath) Papert's pragmatic
focus on computing for children as a way of hreaking the cyclic reproduc-
tion of the anticomputational educational and social milieu, the figure of
the child symbolizes here the lnuuan potential for growth, improvement,
and creative transformation.
One could immediately probe this vision, however, for its ironic dimen-
sion: the delivery of mastery to the children is also the murder of child-
hood per se, for mastery demands responsibility. maturity, and the exer-
cise of calculative, "computational" reason. Viewed this way, Papert's project
could be characterized in his own terms as the programming of mastery
in children. In this regard, Lev Manovich argues in The Language of New
Media that the reality of ulInllllll'r-lllediated interactivity in contemporary
culture responds to a fuudarueutal "den land of modern mass society lor
standardization.":" What is standardized in the GUt computer interface is
an experience of interactivity drawn from a long history of efforts in West-
ern culture and science to analogize interior mental processes. Manovirh
criticizes the notion that interactivity arrived with new media as a myth,
arguing that
all classical, and even more so modern, art is "interactive" in a nuru-
ber of ways. Ellipses in literary narration, missing details of objects in
visual art, and other representational "shortcuts" require the user to till
in missing information. Theater and painting also rely on techniques
of staging and composition to orchestrate the viewer's attention over
time, requiring her [sic] to locus on different parts of the display. With
sculpture and architecture, the viewer has to move her whole body to
experience the spatial structun-."
The design of interactivity in new media forms externalizes the interior,
mental processes involved iu exp"ri,'uting aud inkl prl'ling till'sl' tr,ldi
tional art forms in a process that inevitably commodifies mental processes
in a computer-dominated mass-cultural milieu. In a move that amounts to
a devastating riposte to Papert's ideal vision of the master child of compu-
tational culture, Manovich likens this couunodificatiou of thought to l.ouis
Althusser's notion of interpellation:
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Before we would look at an image and mentally follow our own pri-
vate associations to other images. Now interactive computer media asks
us instead to click on an image in order to go to another image ....
In short, we are asked to follow pre-programmed, objectively existing
associations. Put differently, in what can be read as an updated ver-
sion of French philosopher Louis Althusser's concept of "interpella-
tion," we are asked to mistake the structure of somebody else's mind
for our own."
order to elaborate this conventional function of the" Maskr."" Occasioual
ism attempted to solve the problem of the disjunction betweeu tlu- bod} .uid
the soul in Cartesian philosophy, The two have no contact with each ,;th,'r.
the one being material, the other inuuuterial. Ilow theu, asks Zizek atter
Malebranche, can their coordination be explained>:
Since the two causal networks (tllat of ideas in my mind ;Illd th.u ot
bodily interconnections) are totally independent, the only solution is
that a third, true Substance (God) continuously coordinates and medi-
ates between the two, sustaining the semblance of continuity: when I
think about raising my hand and my hand effectively raises, my thought
causes the raising of my hand 1I0t directly but only "occasionally"-
upon noticing my thought directed at raising my hand, God sets in
motion the other, material, causal chain which leads to my hand effec-
tively being raised."
Zizek immediately proposl'S till' simikuiry lx-twec-u Occasioualism and
Jacques Lacan's psychoanalytic theory of subjectivity by suggesting we
"replace 'God' with the big Other, the symbolic order.":" Like the Occasion-
alist God, this big Other always interposes itself between the network of
mental processes in the subject and the experience of external, material phe-
nomena. The symbolic order, acquired in and through the acquisition of Ian-
guage by the "speaking subject," provides the means for representing and
making sense of the external, meaningless "real" as the subject's "reality."
Just as the God of Occasionalism is not visible to the ordinary perception of
the world, the symbolic order imperceptibly provides the field in which the
subject perceives both the outside world and its own identity vis-a-vis the
outside.
Extending the parallel between Malcbranchc's God and the symbolic
order, Zizek contrasts our "commonplace intuition" about the direct linkage
between body and mind with the "far ruorv insightful premise" informing
the actions of the "ancient Aztec priest who organizes human sacrifices to
ensure that the sun will rise again: the human sacrifice is here an appeal to
God to sustain the coordination between the two series, the bodily necessity
and the concatenation of symbolic events." 27
Malebranche's God (figuring Lacan's big Other) is like a Programmable
Logic Controller that never malfunctions. or rather, "l le" is like the tech-
nician who is always there to guarantee (invisibly) that normal operations
We are able to glimpse a crucial aspect of the promise of interactivity in
Paperr's vision of interactive computing's role in the progress of human-
kind. The figure of the child's mastery over technology evokes the sense
of power that all people experience when they first successfully control the
interface of a personal computer. The interactive interface provides a feeling
of omnipotence to the first-time user through the seemingly magical trans-
lation of intention into action at a distance through the gestures of the hand
holding a mouse, or by the voice activating the selection ofa menu item or
the touch of a finger transforming the entire contents of a screen. This feel-
ing is quickly dimmed as one becomes habituated to the interface in much
the same way as operating a television remote control, or even flicking a
light switch no longer arouse any feelings of amazement or extraordinary
potency in the modern home-dweller.
As is the case with these other devices, the miraculous element of com-
puter use has receded into the background, as the personal computer has
become a familiar part of everyday reality in the West. The wonder is liqui-
dated in the banal routinization of the gestures of mouse click and key-
stroke. For Manovich, the banality of computing in mass culture yields a
commodified, externalized, and preprogrammed perceptual and cognitive
experience for the user, one in which genuine mastery is illusory. As Slavoj
Z.izek has argued in his insightful discussion of interactivity and virtual
reality, "Virtualization of the Master," however, the insistence with which
the user is enjoined by computer design(ers) to become the one who controls
the operation as well as the outcome of the computer event has neverthe-
less undermined the conventional function of mastery today, irrespective of
whether it is seen as illusory or genuine. The consequences of this are, in
Zizek's view, "far more unpredictable and uncanny than ... may appear.""
Zizek mobilizes the eighteenth-century rationalist philosopher and
maverick theologian Nicolas Malebranche's theory of Occasionalisrn in
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will in any event continue. Alluding to the central role of the "Name of
the Father" as principal regulative instance in the symbolic realm acquired
through language, Zizek calls Him "the Master." In another text Zizek, fol-
lowing Lacan, characterizes the symbolic order as a "mechanism" of "sense-
less, idiotic automatism:' terms which immediately recall our earlier discus-
sian of interactive liberty's evil other, narrative prescription as automation."
We can say that in Lacanian terms narrative represents a key modality of the
symbolic ordering of events and experiences which would produce meaning
(normative, patriarchal, logocentric) through an operation which was itself
meaningless and idiotic because mechanical and automatic.
The Master, then, is like an almost perfect computer operating system
that almost never crashes. This minimal potential for the breakdown of the
coordination of material processes and their symbolic, functional ordering
signalled by "almost never" reflects a crucial element in the Lacanian theory
of the constitution of the subject's reality, whereby a "void" or "hole" is
immanent in the reality produced by the symbolic. This ever-present "void,"
a piece or remainder of the "real" in the subject's reality retains the poten-
tial to destabilize the functioning of the big Other and reveal that our "social
reality is nothing but a fragile, symbolic cobweb that can at any moment
be torn aside by an intrusion of the real."29 Despite or, rather, because of
this ever-present void, the Master ensures- from an unseen, unnoted back-
ground - the regular appearance of reality's unfolding of events in predict-
able and meaningful sequences." As such, the Master guarantees the experi-
ence and significance of reality.
According to Zizek, Virtual Reality technology enacts an occasionalist
state of affairs in which the redundancy of the role of the Master in the ordi-
nary course of events is both mirrored and made more explicit. As Zizek
states:
When I raise my hand in order to push an object in the virtual space,
this object effectively moves-my illusion, of course, is that it was the
movement of my hand which directly caused the dislocation of the
object, i.e., in my immersion, I overlook the intricate mechanism of
computerized coordination, homologous to the role of God guarantee-
ing the coordination between the two series in occasionalism."
While till" case with which the "intricate mechanism" of the Virtual Reality
illusion is overlooked repeats the forgetting of the Master function in actual
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reality, at the same time this very repetition becomes JppJrent to the subject
aware of his or her immersion. 'lizek's IIior« g<'Ill>ralpoint about computer
interactivity is that its constant induction of the user into this coun adic-
tory position of both forgetting aud being made aware uf the function of tlu-
Master brings it to a certain crisis and threatens to underuriuc it. He !OCJ!es
the heart of this crisis in the incitemcut 10 masu-ry 11Ild"dying tilt' pl'llnltl·
tion and practice of computer -media ted interactivity. To illustrate this claim
Zizek uses the "classic" contrast between narrative and iuteract ive modes of
cultural text. In a passJge of direct relevance to our discussion of the Blade
Runner game, he describes the "structural impasse of so-called "iuterart ivc
storytelling' in which, at every turn of the story, the reader is free to select his
or her own version of the eve-nts .... " II This situation produces, he argues.
a double discontent in tln- n-ader: (I) lhere is "too much frn'doln," tou
much dr-pc-ncls on nu-. iusu-ad of yi.-ldiug to the pk-asures of th,' u.u
rat iv«. I aru borulxrrdc-d with .I", isions to I", 111:1.1,,: (_~) 1111 n.uv.: t.ut h
in diegetic reality is disturbed. i.e., to the horror or the ofhcial idt'lilogl
of interactive story-lelling, I read a story in order 10 lvaru \I kll "r<\III)"
happened to the hero (did he "really" win over the coveted lady, ctc.},
not in order to decide about the outcome."
The "official ideology" of interactive storytelling promotes a vision of a
reader become teller. It reflects at the level of narrative textual ellgageln,'nt
what we have been describing as the incitement to mastery made explicit in
Papert's promotion of a new mode of child interaction with the computer.
Raymond Bellour, in "The Double Helix," characterizes interactivity in a
similar fashion to Zizek as "throwing the spectator out of his allotted seat
and bringing him [sic) in as an actor, producer, and coproducer of a poten-
tiality." 34 This forcible enlisting of the hitherto deemed "passive" spectator
is also linked by Bellour to a passage beyond the traditional mode of image
reception in Western culture, J mode IItJt "Iroui Hruuelleschi to video. as tlu-
last panoptic eye, has concentrated the power to make images around a god
who has become more and more absent but always has remained invisibly
fruitful." "
Interactivity's promot ion of the user as master. then, threatens to depose
this god who, like the disappearing god of Malebranche, is less and less
necessary in lite Cartesian raliollalisl universe. almost redundant in the
humanist cosmos of European modernity in which "man" becomes subject
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of history and agent of representation, This god's invisible fruitfulness is
challenged by interactivity's violation of a "rule" implicit in narrative form,
a rule which is crucial. argues Zizek, to the role that narrative plays in con-
structing and affirming our sense of reality and all that is consequent on that
sense, the sense we make of things, How does Zizek formulate this rule?
"Master's main role," he says, "is to state the obvious."36 When we follow a
story, we know it has a determined ending. Why then, would we watch a
story that we've already seen? We know what will happen, but we are fre-
quently surprised, or anxious, or happy all over again. It is, says Zizek, "as
if. at another level, we were not quite sure that the inevitable would happen
again, , , ,"" The Master's function is to close this temporal gap between
what should and what will happen, In doing so the Master guarantees one
more time the normal sequential order of things, their logical connection
and continuity, and thus the apparent inevitability of spatiotemporal reality
as it is perceived, lived, and remembered,
The concerted effort of the "official ideology" of interactivity-to pro-
mote mastery over the computer, to achieve computational liberation from
servitude in traditional forms of cultural production, to become active
users rather than passive spectators-undermines the Master. Zizek con-
cludes his discussion in "Virtualization of the Master" by warning of the
"unpredictable and uncanny" consequences of this." In The Plague of Fan-
tusies Zizek discusses cyberspace and the rhetoric ofliberation surrounding
online forms of communication and community in a similar vein, He claims
that "the decline of the function of the Master in contemporary Western
societies exposes the subject to radical ambiguity in the face of his desire." 39
The subject faces, that is, the void of the real (the meaningless externality
that is mediated via the symbolic order in the construction of a meaningful
reality) in this suspension of symbolic mastery, whose main function "is to
tell the subject what he wants-the need for the Master arises in answer to
till' slIl>j"l'!'S confusion, insofur as II<'dell'S not know what he wants."?" l h-u-
Zizek delivers a critique of the ideology of "cyber-liberation" by positing the
essential role the symbolic order plays as a constraint against which the sub-
ject can struggle to achieve its desires and exercise its freedom, By insisting
that the subject choose everything, invent him- or herselffrom a total avail-
ability of possibilities, communicate and interact with anyone or anything
at all, cyber-liberation suspends the operation of the (symbolic) Master with
unexpected results:
The vision of cyberspace opening up a future of uueudiug possibilities
of limitless change, of new multiple sex organs, and so on, conceals its
exact opposite: an unheard-of imposition of radical closure, This, then,
is the Real await ing us, and all c-udeuvours to symbolise this Real, from
utopian (the New Ag, or "dt'cousll'llLliouisl" tt'lebrations of the liber-
ating potentials of cyberspaec') to the blackest dystopiau ones (the pros-
pect of the total control by a God-like computerized network, , .] are just
that: so many attempts to avoid the true "end of history," the paradox
of an infinity far more suffocating than any actual confinement."
While I would concur with Zizek's critique of a total cyber-liberation from
the Master, I would like to return to the Blade Runner game here in order
to speculate on the "uncanuy" nature of its partial destabilization of the
Mastel'. As outlined earlier. key aspects or Ihe ganlt' indicate tl n- incom-
plete nature of its fulfilruvnt of the "ollicial ideology" or iutvract ivitv. 1-<>1
instance, while till' playl'J' 1'~111cout rol t lu' narrative sl'lilll'llt't' and alter t lu-
ouu'ouu- or Ilit' g~lIne's story tlirollgli llie g~lInl' pl.ly, IIi•.r,' ~II" ,','Il.lln c ru
cial sequences in the ganlt' in which "cut-scvuv .urim.uious" t.ik« pl.l'" ilk,'
movie segments during which the player can only sit back and watch, 'lhes«
sequences are key transitional phases in the game's overall structure into
acts and they correspond with new scenes being loaded onto the computer's
RAM Iroru disk, 'I'lu-s« transitioua! sequvno-s arc' a m-cess.ny convent ion in
adventure and role-play games (such as the '1'01 11b Raider series, l\kt.ll Ce.1I
Solid, and the Resident Evil series), which stage their action in a number lit
different fictive spaces.
Narrative structure in the form of scene setting motivated by at least per·
functory causal explanation-- and commouly by .1more subst.iut i.il iml'st
ment in classical narrative features such as character development, relation-
ships with support ing cas I, and pmv ision or lxukstory is Ilu-n ~ISllnle\\ h.11
inescapahh' far! of the genre of the interactive adventure gallle, The Blad •.
Runner gall It' is no I'XI"pIIOII III Ihis, TI.lllsil ions 1ll'1\\,"'11 .II Is illl llh,' inl,',
actions with other characters that both advance tlu- game's slt'nallo and
reveal other information about McCoy's character and his past or prest'nl
associations with other characters. These sequences vary according 10 th,'
order in which the gamer has discovered things and accomplished tasks, bUI
also according to tlu- nature of tlu- strategy she or he has adopted vis-a-vis
the replicants, namely, whether to playas a "sympathizer" or ~IS .1 straiglil
"repdetective" intent on rdiring all the replicants McCoy comes across. This
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basic strategic decision has a number of alternatives that are combinations
or complications of the simple choice between two absolute positions. In
a way that exemplifies the standardization of computer-mediated interac-
tivity described by Manovich, the Blade Runner game provides a range of
narrativizations of the game experience that are flexible but drawn from a
set of predesigned alternatives.
The Blade Runner game, like all adventure games, is not a pure inter-
active experience. As such, it does not effect the complete suspension ofthe
Master function, the consequences of which Zizek theorizes, It constrains
the garner by provision of a structure of options for playing the game that
delimits his or her goals, strategies, and tactics for achieving those goals.
Nevertheless, it has in common with other adventure games and indeed
with new media forms in general that it forces the interactor to make a
choice at every stage. In doing so, it enacts the incitement to interactive
mastery even within this hybrid form still overshadowed by the narrative
automaton.
The gamer's relation to the McCoy character-avatar mirrors this hybridity
of narrative and interactivity. Game settings allow you to have a limited
degree of control over his verbal interactions with other characters-the
user can select horn a menu of responses and topics of inquiry-or McCoy
can be set to respond automatically in one of three registers: polite, neu-
tral, or surly." As I stated earlier in this essay, the player can alter McCoy's
identity between human and replicant from game to game by regulating his
behavior toward the other characters. One is limited, however, to the white
male "envelope" of the stereotypical noir detective."
McCoy is an uncanny double of the game player. Like all doubles, he
both resembles and differs from the original he duplicates. Familiar but
strange, he is seen in third-person view, but he is the gamer's double. In
many respects the game is about the problem of "determining" who McCoy
is - the problem being, above all, a problem of deciding whether "to deter-
mine" means "to find out once and for all" or "to make or create" (as in
"self-determination"). But this is an uncanny project that rebounds on the
gamer in the era of interactivity when everything must be decided by the
subject-master for whom it is no longer possible to "state the obvious" about
something so fundamental as, say, one's own identity.
That this most obvious something cannot be readily asserted recalls the
familiar psychoanalytic and philosophical scenario of the subject's strange-
ness to itself, a scenario thematized in the Bluat: RUlilia lihn through the
affinity posited between replicant and human as objects of manipulation,
artifice and prostheticized experience. In this regard, the relation of McCoy
to the gamer who plays through him corresponds also to the relation of the
game to the film. The game is an uncanny double of the fih}!, familiar yet
strange. It is like the film in that, as Scott Bukatman has shown, the film
provides a sustained encounter with "the metropolitan world" but "under-
determines the lessons of that encounter, it effectively undermines inter-
pretative certitudes."" The Blade Runne-r game works in this thematic ter-
rain as well, but its strangeness lies in its extension of this pl'Ocess across
media forms from cinematic narrative to interactive computer game. The
uncertain spectator is now the uuconvinced interactor - both master and
automaton of the game's progress and prerogatives. It is in the play that
exists between these putatively fixed poles (mastery of the Blade Runner
universe versus a reiterated entrapment within it) that at one level the gamer
plays when inside the compelling recreation of the extraordinary diegesis
of the Blude RWlIlu film. This play with and between narrative and interne-
tivity is ostensibly a double or nothing bet but the dividend may be neither.
To put it another way, lhe uncanuy outcome of the promise of interactivity
to arrive at the one who is both subject and master of the computational cul-
ture may be the advent of one who is neither-an advent that would also be
the return of something familiar.
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Andrew McNamara and Peter Krapp
Introd uction
An intense experiencemust be "forgotten," "cen-
sored,"and reducedto a verycool state before it can
be "learned"or assimilated.
- MarshallMcLuhan,"MediaHot andCold"
~e question of the medium is today almost
totally subsumed within discussions of the mass
media.' In this context, the medium is always
regarded as plural and as a ubiquitous feature of
everyday life in the industrialized world. The fact
that the mass media constitute such a ubiquitous
presence in contemporary life means the issue
of medium, or media, is often thought to arise as
a special issue with the advent of mass media.
Yet the very issue of the medium became a
central concern of modernist art practice almost
a century and a half ago. The original impetus of
this collection of essays was to reopen this long
history of exploration and engagement. To that
end, many of the essays collected here scrutinize
the role of the medium in fields as diverse as
modernist and contemporary art practice, the
avant-garde tradition, photography, cinema, and
architecture as well as in the more familiar con-
temporary guises of electronic media, television,
and computer games.
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The aim of this collection, therefore, is to explore what considerations
such a diverse and long-standing commitment to media brought to our
understanding of this pivotal issue. This diversity of approaches uncovers
how familiar reflections of the medium remain: many of the essays in this
collection touch on a continuing debate that oscillates between values of
freedom and constraint. The medium is too often assumed to be a transpar-
ent phenomenon that simply transmits meaning from one place to another
without delaying or transforming the intended meaning. In political dis-
course, transparency is an important issue because it goes together with
accountability as a central tenet ofdemocratic practice. Is it merely perverse,
then, to stress "opacity" as an equally fundamental feature in examining
the role of media? This collection of essays suggests not. The issue may be
reworked to ask, Can one equate a democratic impetus with the inverse of
transparency? Of particular interest here is the way the visual-in its many
guises-constitutes a core feature of our media image of the world.
This collection asks,What is the status of the visual in these screen pre-
sentations? Is the mediated view of the world wholly dependent on spe-
cific ideas of what constitutes the visual- that is, the visual as direct and
sensuously immediate? And what happens to the question of aura when
the concept of media, of the medium, is extended and proliferates? The
focus of these questions arose from a series of weekly seminars presented
by Samuel Weber at Queensland University of Technology (QUT),Brisbane,
Australia, while a QUT Visiting Fellow in July-August 1998. This fellow-
ship was organized by Rod Wissler, director of the Centre for Innovation
in the Arts, with the assistance of Andrew McNamara and Toni Ross. The
seminars explored approaches to these questions from Plato and Aristotle to
the contemporary media scene, and the series rounded offwith a weekend
symposium, "Medium Cool,"August 22-23, 1998, from which the majority
of these essays derive. The symposium sought to explore the theme of the
medium to coincide with the focus ofWeber's series of seminars at QUT.Of
the essays presented in this special issue, those of Keith Broadfoot, Patrick
Crogan, Catherine Liu, Rosemary Hawker, John Macarthur, and Lisa Tra-
hair accord more or less with the papers presented at the QUT symposium.
Others have changed or shifted substantially in that long interlude. The
essayswere not intended to engage directlywith Weber's work on the theme
ofmedium, but evenwith the addition of contributions from European and
U.S. scholars, a surprising number of the texts in this collection did find
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impetus in Weber's explorations. Thus what was once an implicit engage-
ment with Weber's ideas, particularly, mass mediaura, was developed into
an explicit focus in drawing together a number of essays by scholars who
engage directly with Weber's themes in regard to media.
In "Abstraction and Aura," Keith Broadfoot takes Weber's study and elabo-
ration of Walter Benjamin's ideas about aura as a basis for developing an
alternative understanding of modernist art practice-one that shifts the tra-
jectory from a presumption that modem art is the natural consequence of
a shift from cultic understandings of art to an ever greater emphasis on
exhibition value. If, as Weber argues, aura is the name for an "undepictable
de-piction of distancing and separation," what is it to speak of painting and
aura? Looking at the work of Jackson Pollock, Frank Stella, and Jasper Johns,
Broadfoot presents an argument for rethinking the history of modernist
painting in terms of how painting successively performs this undepictable
de-piction of distancing and separation.
The focus of Andrew McNamara's essay is on how the scrutiny of the
medium becomes central to the avant-garde's claim to maintain a radically
critical regard to the generally accepted postulates of "visuality.' In devel-
oping the notion of "medium-specificity," Clement Greenberg asks us to
grasp art as "opaque." In response, Thierry de Duve suggests that Greenberg
means that such identity is grasped in love and confrontation. McNamara
ponders why art may be risked in the avant-garde venture, but not judg-
ment (at least, as far as the critics are concerned): in love and confrontation,
judgment is preferable on the side oflove alone.
In "'Bright Shadows': Art, Aboriginality, and Aura," Rex Butler explores
Samuel Weber's analysis of Walter Benjamin in Weber's essay, "Mass Medi-
auras, or: Art, Aura and Media in the Work of Walter Benjamin" in order to
understand how contemporary Aboriginal art, despite increasingly adopt-
ing the look and techniques of tourist-driven kitsch, remains profoundly
auratic. It then goes on to explore the way in which the auratic work retains
its mystery precisely because of the fact that it is made for us, that we are
"put into the picture."
Catherine Liu traces an approach to photography as understood in terms
of the family album in "Getting to the Photo Finish: Photography, Autobi-
ography, Modernity." As a genre, the family album provokes reflection on
the question of modernity, which Liu pinpoints in the intersection of pho-
tography and (or as) autobiography. Between the art photograph and the
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snap shot, subtle differences engage the discourses not only of technology
and aesthetics, but of history and politics as well. Liu demonstrates this
meticulously in reading pictures by Alfred Stieglitz, August Sander, and
Liu's immigrant father. By the same token, the speed of photography can
not only exposewhat is invisible to the naked eye, but make visible what the
rapid progress of technology tends to suppress as mere dreck-the eradica-
tion ofwhich lies at the very heart of photography, as Gerhard Richter's use
of the blur shows.
Rosemary Hawker brings a consideration of "idiom," as proposed by
Jacques Derrida ("Passe Partout," The Truth in Painting) as well as Samuel
Weber's discussion of medium theatricality to a discussion of Gerhard
Richter's "photopaintings" in her essay "The Idiom in Photography As the
Truth in Painting." Richter promises, in his photopaintings, to paint a
photograph, as opposed to painting photographically. He does this through
the use of visual traits that are idiomatic to the medium of photography,
namely, photographic blur and lack of focus. What is idiomatic is what can
be observed but not translated. In citing photography in painting, Richter
marks out this difference for our scrutiny. For him, the idiom in photogra-
phy is the truth in painting only insofar as both betray their persistence and
mutability.
In "Art in the 'Post-Medium' Era: Aesthetics and Conceptualism in the
Art of JeffWall," Toni Ross responds to the negative forecasts of the fate
of aesthetics within postmodernity offered by Fredric Jameson and Slavoj
Zizek. Both see the progressive commodification of culture as diminish-
ing art's sublimating potential: that is, its ability to produce sensory signs
of another order in excess of ordinary symbolic and economic exchanges.
Jameson therefore judges those currently advocating a return to aesthet-
ics as both misguided and intent on negating the critical and conceptualist
legacy of post-sixties art. Examining the interplay of aesthetics and concep-
tualism in a work by JeffWall, Ross argues that his work evades a common
opposition between aesthetics and conceptualism, thus maintaining a sub-
limating capacity for art.
Lisa Trahair takes up Weber's rereading of Heidegger's "The Question
Concerning Technology," in order to examine the role of technology in
Buster Keaton's films. In so doing, she attempts to avoidthe narrowly instru-
mental reading of Keaton's work that is common in other commentaries.
Exploring the connotations of Weber's retranslating of the Heideggerian
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term, Gestell, as "emplacement," Trahair questions the privilege of art as the
special arena for reflection on technology and reads Keaton's comedic treat-
ment of technology, causality, and instrumentalism as offering an alterna-
tive to the type of technological worldview Heidegger criticized.
In "Unforgiven: Fausse Reconnaissance," Peter Krapp demonstrates how
certain conventions of mass media, specifically the treatment of violence
and weather, offer access to what is made forgotten in the unforgiving
medium of film. His reading of a Clint Eastwood movie throws into relief
the disturbances of cultural memory between fiction, or a past that never
was, and the instant replay of "breaking news," or an immediate present that
will never have been immediate nor present.
Georg Stanitzek asks, in "Fama/Chain of Muses: TwoClassical Problems
of Literary Studies with 'the Media,'" why some cultural critics still har-
bor a certain philological resentment against "the media" and "media cul-
ture," even though -or perhaps because- the competence ofmedia studies
clearly evolved from within their ranks. His question is not simply what
happens to literature in the age of television, but how two discourses about
the mass media can be traced back to two ancient positions: rumor and the
chain of muses. Exploiting the current between their polarity, he proceeds
to switch the TV on and offwith Ovid and Plato.
Wolfgang Ernst's essay, "Between Real Time and Memory on Demand:
Reflections on/of Television," excavates the early history of television in
order to put on our screens how it programs today's and tomorrow's chan-
nels and contents. Advocating media archaeology as a nonhermeneutic
approach, Ernst digs deep to restore a sense of the medium and its true
capacity. He seeks to liberate media studies from a traditional fixation on
programs as content, and to begin deciphering media and their effects as
functions of programming in the sense of computer science.
Patrick Crogan analyzes the theme of interactivity, in his essay "Blade
Runners: Speculations on Narrative and Interactivity," by comparing the
Blade Runner computer adventure game with the classic postmodern film
on which it is based. He critically examines a common assumption in dis-
courses on new media that equates interactivity with liberation from the
bonds of narrative. In critically exploring this presumption, Crogan inves-
tigates similar claims regarding interactivity made in regard to the Blade
Runner game as well as in terms of a postmodern, posthuman interface.
Georg Christoph Tholen delineates how the ceaseless shifting of meta-
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phors complicates the work of media studies in his essay "Media Meta-
phorology: Irritations in the Epistemic Field of Media Studies." Taking up
Samuel Weber's concern with "taking place," he demonstrates that the way
we situate media, how we pose and ponder the question about the location
of the medium, necessarily transforms the relation between concepts and
metaphors of media. Once all media become digitalized and subsumed in
the notion of a purported "universal medium" - the personal computer-
the postdramatic mediality of the medium is performed by ghostly inter-
faces and surfaces.
John Macarthur considers the role of the visual image in architecture by
examining instances of contemporary architecture that include a program
of applied imagery. Looking at the interplay of architecture and the visual
art, Macarthur surprises the reader by developing some key insights about
the nature of the architectural medium. He argues that architects such as
Jacques Herzog and Pierre de Meuron use images as the material for an
architectural work in the same manner that another architect might select
glass or steel. At stake in such architectural work are both the techniques
for working with images at the level of their materiality and the intermedi-
ary space of the visual. Furthermore, Macarthur contrasts the general phe-
nomenology implied by "visual cultures" with the material and historical
variability that has been envisaged in art and architecture.
Two contributions appear from Samuel Weber. One is an interview that
deals with many principal themes in Weber's work, particularly his focus on
media and the medium. The other develops some of the same concerns in a
meditation on the events of September II, including its media fallout, which
Weber reads as part and parcel of the terrorist attacks. He explores their
interaction by showing how spectacle is intrinsic to both the "War against
Terrorism" and the acts of terrorism. For Weber, this confluence in a highly
ambivalent media spectacle marks a truly significant aspect of "9/n."
Although arguably "in the jumbo jet, media are more densely connected
than in most places," they remain divided into two areas of competence.
Computers, radar, diode displays, radio beacons, nonpublic channels are at
the disposal of a necessarily interactive crew, while passengers are restricted
to audio tape, film, and airline "cuisine" -one-way consumption, with the
notable exception of the in-flight telephone.' To different degrees, then, one
may opt to be partially disconnected from the experience of flight by canned
media, or one may attempt to brave the tasks of navigation and service with
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multiple connections. This amassing of all media in one place can deliver
any message-even the final message that is the bomb. Yet to passengers
and crew, and by extension to all of us living in media society, the direction
our sensurround takes us is not always evident.
Attention to such contexts allows for an inquiry into "the media" as a
quest to circumscribe a discourse without author: a discourse that no longer
advertises its desire, following different and diffuse rules of sending and
receiving. Beyond communicating one-to-one, one-to-many, or even many-
to-one, the logic of the media transforms the context of observation into a
network of "many-to-many." In this way, technical media become suspect
precisely because they have, or because they are, power-and because their
power is ubiquitous and inescapable. To gain perspective on them, to inter-
pret them, one cannot simply travel or relocate, run away or hide. There is no
source, no center, no origin to the network that ceaselessly circulates, repro-
duces, and amplifies information. Thus to seek understanding, to halt and
interpret, to read and communicate competently may become possible only
if the observation of media structures, and media effects, is organized by a
heightened attention to one's own situation in observing, in the sense that
one remains suspicious of suspicions.' Media studies would momentarily
suspend the sensurround: and it is this mode of interruption that gives rise
to the insights of media studies, to a medium's readability, citability, to the
stutter of paraphrases. In exploring "what it means to be situated in and by a
world organized by 'the media:" Weber suggests "nothing more or less than
acknowledging what has probably always obtained: that we only take place,
from time to time, between places rather than in them, in the instant of an
intervening interval.""
Notes
I The quotation by Marshall Mcluhan that opens this introduction is from Mcluhan,
"Media Hot and Cold,"in Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man (london: McGraw-
Hill, I964), 32.
2 Friedrich Kittler's remarks regarding the airline industry can be found in the first transla-
tion of his preface to Gramophone, Film. Typewriter (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
I999). This version appeared in October 4I (I987): IOI-I8, and was reprinted in Friedrich
Kittler, Literature Media Information Systems, ed. John Johnston (Amsterdam: G+B Arts
International, I997), 28-49; quotation from p. Inexplicably,however, this paragraph is
missing from the translation of the entire book (2).
3 Samuel M. Weber, "Fellowship," Grosz/jung/Grosz, ed. GUnter Bose and Erich Brink-
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mann (Berlin: Brinkmann and Bose, 1980), 159-72. See also Weber's introduction to
his influential 1973 German edition of Schreber's memoirs, translated in Daniel Paul
Schreber, Memoirs ofMy Nervous Illness (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1988), vii-
!iv, which in turn has had a profound influence on media studies in general and scholars
such as Kittler in particular.
4 Samuel M. Weber, "'Between a Human Life and aWord': Benjamin's Excitable Gestures,"
in Mediatized Drama, Dramatized Media, ed. Eckart Voigts-Virchow (Trier: WVT, 2000),




Blade Runners: Speculations on
Narrative and Interactivity
he 1998 release of Westwood Studio's Blade
Runner computer game offers a unique opportu-
nity to speculate on a key element of new media
forms: interactivity. There are two principal rea-
sons for this: first, the game may be compared to
the film-or rather films-on which it is based,
Ridley Scott's Blade Runner (1982) as well as the
"director's cut" released a decade later. Aside
from the promise of a comparison between film
and computer game for providing insight into
the differences between narrative and interactive
media forms, this exercise is particularly felici-
tous in the case of the Blade Runner films. Jean-
Francois Lyotard's influential proposition in The
Postmodern Condition (first published in 1979)
regarding a dissolution of the legitimizing force
of the great narratives of European modernity-
those of universal emancipation, enlightenment,
and progress - precipitated a wider questioning
of the nature and function of narratives in the
formation of social structures and individual
identity.' Blade Runner has attracted considerable
critical interest in this regard as a film that imag-
ines (and images) a dystopian, postmodern near
future in which history has emptied out into a
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jumble of cultural, linguistic, and architectural fragments, and in which
individual identity is a tenuous proposition, never far removed from inde-
terminacy and illegitimacy.s
It is in this context of the widespread questioning of the forms and out-
comes of the project and progress of Western modernity that the discourse
has developed promoting the new media's superior modality of engagement
with and between individuals in the guise of interactivity. Discussion of the
benefits of interactivity over narrativity has tended to align itself with a para-
digm shift toward a postmodern, posthuman situation in which pluralist
social formations and multiple identity options succeed modernist ideals of
national monocultural identity.'
This enthusiasm for interactivity leads me to my second principal reason
for examining the Blade Runner game. It has received a mixed reception
in the game-playing community that is indicative, I argue, of an internal
tension in the game's adaptation of the film. This tension exists between
its interactive and narrative elements. While it has won praise from many
quarters (including picking up an Academy of Interactive Arts and Sciences
Award in the adventure game category), one hard-nosed game reviewer, Ron
Dulin, has criticized the Blade Runner game for failing to live up to its prom-
ise to revolutionize the adventure game genre: It was promoted as "the first
real-time adventure game" that had "a constantly changing plot" peopled
with characters armed with sufficient artificial intelligence to make game
play unpredictable and highly responsive to player interaction.' These prom-
ises have not been fulfilled, according to Dulin, who argues quite correctly
that the game is too "automated" in terms of navigation, the occurrence of
key events, and the ability of the player to play with/in the interface,"
This criticism of the game as too automated is illuminating. It mobilizes
what is the key binary opposition structuring both mainstream and criti-
cal discourses on computer-mediated interactivity: that between freedom
and constraint. Interactivity is generally presumed to offer greater freedom
to the media user, who is no longer simply a passive recipient of broadcast
transmissions-no longer constrained by an inability to respond, alter, or
otherwise interact directly with the media text. Conventional narrative, with
its closed, linear, and predetermined form, is seen as the model instance of
constraint against which the new media struggle
Yet the notion of automation does not only involve the opposition of free-
dom and constraint. It also refers to the process of regulated mechanical
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(re)production, of blind machinic repetition, a process whose polar opposite
is the human activity of crafting the handmade item. This polarity is funda-
mental to the analysis of the modern industrial age of mass reproduction,
and it can be seen in the film's narrative and figural preoccupations with
various forms of automatons, artificial organisms, and replicants. Indeed,
Blade Runner's parable of the fate oflate capitalist society revolvesaround the
Nexus 6 replicants, "who" represent a terminally unstable machineJhuman
amalgam - "more human than human" is the Tyrell Corporation's motto for
the Nexus 6 cyborgs.
Automation, as a production method, does not allow for human inter-
vention or interaction, except in the form of the controller, a veritable deus
ex machina who prescribes the sequence of actions and who may inter-
vene to halt or correct the course of events in exceptional circumstances.
In automated factory production systems the name of the mechanism for
this exterior control is the Programmable Logic Controller. As a product
at the forefront of interactive gaming, the Blade Runner game attempts to
minimize the influence of such prescription by transferring as much con-
trol as possible to the individual "interactor," who manufactures the course
of events through his or her eye-hand interface with the screen. In its effort
to reproduce the design, ambience, and thematic significance of the film,
however, the game remains faithful to modes of narrativity and spectator
positioning that are commonly associated with the broadcast forms of con-
ventional modern media. Examples of these modes include the following:
I. The game is divided into "acts,"which begin and end with connect-
ing sequences that are "cut-scene" animations with no interactive ele-
ment; the gamer can only watch these scene-setting transitions for
clues about the progress of the game's plot.
2. A predesigned narrative chain of events is just waiting to begin
regardless of the unfolding of other events in the game's diegesis. For
example, some events that occur in the game, like the bombing of the
Dermo Design laboratory on DNARowin act 2, take place only when
the player's third-person avatar, the blade runner Ray McCoy, enters
the building.
3. The sets have limited scope for interactivity; for instance, McCoy
has extremely limited options regarding both the clues he finds (he can
collect and sort them in a viewable database but do nothing else with
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them) and what he can do with his weapon (he cannot draw it out and
fire at anyone or any object, nor can he threaten "figures" with it).
The Blade Runner game, then, can be thought of as caught in a contradictory
position in its negotiation of the opposition between interactive liberty and
narrative prescription, a position that opens up the possibility of a critique
of this opposition. This opportunity is all the more advantageous for the cor-
respondences that exist between the computer game's intermediary posi-
tion and the thematic trajectory of the film it has replicated. As Scott Bukat-
man has pointed out in his British Film Institute monograph, Blade Runner
is a film in which "the more we see, the more our uncertainty grows." It
presents a world in which visibility is increased through various techno-
logical means (overhead audiovisual surveillance, the Voigt-Kampff test of
minute facial reactions, the Esper photo analysis machine, the floating bill-
boards, etc.) but in which the reliability of what is seen is correspondingly
decreased: Who is really human? Is Zhora's pet a real snake or an artifi-
cial one? Are Deckard's photos real or simulated? This uncertainty parallels
and magnifies the ambiguity and ethical ambivalence of the narrative's epis-
temological project of determining who is human and who is not human
and, therefore, who should be killed and who should survive at the film's
conclusion.
Every stage of the game's replication of the film provides the chance to
speculate on the validity of the putative opposition between mechanical
repetition (narrative) and innovative creation (interactivity). To say that the
game replicates the film is, of course, already speculative in the sense I have
just described because the game is not intended to be an exact replica of
the film in the literal sense of a precise reproduction. It is nevertheless a
"replicant" in the Tyrell Corporation's use of that term-a copy modeled on
an original that is designed to be superior to that original by exceeding its
capacities ("more human than human"). The game purports to be "more
Blade Runner than Blade Runner" in that it not only provides the ambience,
technologies, and scenarios of the film, but also, through interactive design,
immerses the gamer inside the Blade Runner milieu with all of its episte-
mological traps and ethical doubts.
The film's speculation about whether the blade runner who hunts the
replicants is himself a replicant also plays a decisive part in the various nar-
rative branches of the game's multilinear story structure. In some of its
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alternative trajectories the gamer's avatar McCoy turns out to be a repIicant
and finds himself being hunted along with the replicants he was seeking
to "retire." Indeed, the interactor can influence this narrative turn of events
through his or her initial behavior toward the replicants being investigated.
The identity of the detective is a central issue of the film's interrogation of
the nature of humanity in an age of sophisticated technological reproduc-
tion and simulation. The game incorporates this speculation as an active
element of game play by putting McCoy's identity itself into playas a key
variable in calculating how the game's events unfold."
In doing so the game thematizes what David Rokeby has described as
the reflexive nature of interactive technology and technology more gener-
ally. For Rokeby, "a technology is interactive to the degree that it reflects
the consequences of our actions or decisions back to us," so that an inter-
active technology is a "mirror" of sorts," This mirror is not purely reflective
in that it does not only give back a simple self-image to the human user. It
also "refracts what it is given; what is returned is ourselves, transformed and
processed."ll For Rokeby, a critical understanding of interactive technology
should be sought via exploration of the dialectic between the reflective and
refractive instances of the technological mirror, that is, between the mirror-
ing of the user and the transformative impact of technological mediation
that "provides us with a sense of the relation between this self and the experi-
enced world."12 The Blade Runner game offers itself to just such a dialectical
exploration through its structuring of game play so that the interactor may
or may not be a nonhuman, replicant cyborg depending on their interactions
with the game world."
If the game is a mirror, then it provides the opportunity for specula-
tion on the nature of the human/technology relationship and the potential
of interactive media to deliver greater freedom and creativity to the indi-
vidual subject. But as Jacques Derrida cautions, all speculation is a gamble
because in its mirroring of other acts and interactions, speculative discourse
arrives at a constitutive uncertainty as to its own identity vis-a-vis that on
which it speculates." Given the risky nature of this venture, one that I would
argue against Rokeby cannot be rendered completely secure by recourse to
Hegelian dialectics, but that nevertheless is concerned crucially with the
oppositional structure foundational to Hegelian philosophy-that of the self
(the human subject) and the objective, nonhuman (technological) other-
I offer these necessarily chancy speculations on the nature of interactivity,
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borrowing from Blade Runners in the hope of profiting from the reflective
venture.
To initiate this venture I first want to consider the rhetoric of computer
mediated interactivity by recalling briefly the history of the development
of computer interfaces. This will enable me to highlight the central role
the figure of the child played in the influential discourse that promoted
computer-mediated interactivity.
In his account of the progress of virtual reality technologies, Howard
Rheingold describes the influential work done by Seymour Papert in the late
1960s and 1970S at the MIT Artificial Intelligence Laboratory on making
computers accessible to children." Through the person of Alan Kay,a stu-
dent of Papert's, this orientation of interface development fed into the work
done at Xerox's famous Palo Alto Research Center (PARC)in the 1970s.
PARCassembled the research team responsible for inventing the basic com-
ponents of the graphical user interface or GUI (mouse, icon-based inter-
face). The PARC team used children to test whether their experimental
interface designs were effective.
In his book Mindstorms: Children, Computers and Powerful Ideas, Papert
states that two major themes have shaped his research agenda, namely "that
children can learn to use computers in a masterful way, and that learning
to use computers can change the way they learn everything else,"> Writing
in 1980, Papert acknowledged the influence on his work of the theories of
French psychologist Jean Piaget concerning children as "builders of their
own intellectual structures."17 This notion informed Papert's own aspira-
tions regarding the incorporation of computing in the education system:
In many schools today, the phrase "computer-aided instruction" means
making the computer teach the child. One might say the computer is
being used to program the child. In my vision, the child programs the com-
puter, and, in doing so, both acquires a sense ofmastery over a piece of
the most modem and powerful technology and establishes an intimate
contact with some of the deepest ideas from science, mathematics, and
from the art of intellectual model building."
Mastery overmodem technology for the child, and, in time, for all humans
is Papert's influential vision for computing. It is presumed achievable
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through the transformation of computers from instrumental, noncommu-
nicative adjuncts to established modes of learning to responsive, program-
mable, interactive model-building machines, the building blocks of tomor-
row's "computational cultures."19Beyond (or beneath) Papert's pragmatic
focus on computing for children as a way of breaking the cyclic reproduc-
tion of the anticomputational educational and social milieu, the figure of
the child symbolizes here the human potential for growth, improvement,
and creative transformation.
One could immediately probe this vision, however, for its ironic dimen-
sion: the delivery of mastery to the children is also the murder of child-
hood per se, for mastery demands responsibility, maturity, and the exer-
cise of calculative, "computational" reason. Viewedthis way,Papert's project
could be characterized in his own terms as the programming of mastery
in children. In this regard, LevManovich argues in The Language of New
Media that the reality of computer-mediated interactivity in contemporary
culture responds to a fundamental "demand of modem mass society for
standardization.v" What is standardized in the GUI computer interface is
an experience of interactivity drawn from a long history of efforts in West-
ern culture and science to analogize interior mental processes. Manovich
criticizes the notion that interactivity arrived with new media as a myth,
arguing that
all classical, and even more so modem, art is "interactive" in a num-
ber of ways. Ellipses in literary narration, missing details of objects in
visual art, and other representational "shortcuts" require the user to fill
in missing information. Theater and painting also rely on techniques
of staging and composition to orchestrate the viewer's attention over
time, requiring her [sic]to focus on different parts of the display.With
sculpture and architecture, the viewer has to move her whole body to
experience the spatial structure."
The design of interactivity in new media forms externalizes the interior,
mental processes involved in experiencing and interpreting these tradi-
tional art forms in a process that inevitably commodifies mental processes
in a computer-dominated mass-cultural milieu. In a move that amounts to
a devastating riposte to Papert's ideal vision of the master child of compu-
tational culture, Manovich likens this commodification of thought to Louis
Althusser's notion of interpellation:
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Before we would look at an image and mentally follow our own pri-
vate associations to other images. Nowinteractive computer media asks
us instead to click on an image in order to go to another image ....
In short, we are asked to follow pre-programmed, objectively existing
associations. Put differently, in what can be read as an updated ver-
sion of French philosopher Louis Althusser's concept of "interpella-
tion," we are asked to mistake the structure of somebody else's mind
for our ownP
We are able to glimpse a crucial aspect of the promise of interactivity in
Papert's vision of interactive computing's role in the progress of human-
kind. The figure of the child's mastery over technology evokes the sense
of power that all people experience when they first successfully control the
interface of apersonal computer. The interactive interface provides a feeling
of omnipotence to the first-time user through the seemingly magical trans-
lation of intention into action at a distance through the gestures of the hand
holding a mouse, or by the voice activating the selection of a menu item or
the touch of a finger transforming the entire contents of a screen. This feel-
ing is quickly dimmed as one becomes habituated to the interface in much
the same way as operating a television remote control, or even flicking a
light switch no longer arouse any feelings of amazement or extraordinary
potency in the modern home-dweller.
As is the case with these other devices, the miraculous element of com-
puter use has receded into the background, as the personal computer has
become a familiar part of everyday reality in the West. The wonder is liqui-
dated in the banal routinization of the gestures of mouse click and key-
stroke. For Manovich, the banality of computing in mass culture yields a
commodified, externalized, and preprogrammed perceptual and cognitive
experience for the user, one in which genuine mastery is illusory. As Slavoj
ZiZek has argued in his insightful discussion of interactivity and virtual
reality, "Virtualization of the Master," however, the insistence with which
the user is enjoined by computer design(ers) to become the one who controls
the operation as well as the outcome of the computer event has neverthe-
less undermined the conventional function ofmastery today, irrespective of
whether it is seen as illusory or genuine. The consequences of this are, in
ZiZek's view, "far more unpredictable and uncanny than ... may appear." 23
Zizek mobilizes the eighteenth-century rationalist philosopher and
maverick theologian Nicolas Malebranche's theory of Occasionalism in
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order to elaborate this conventional function of the "Master." 24Occasional-
ism attempted to solve the problem of the disjunction between the body and
the soul in Cartesian philosophy. The two have no contact with each other,
the one being material, the other immaterial. How then, asks Zizek after
Malebranche, can their coordination be explained?:
Since the two causal networks (that of ideas in my mind and that of
bodily interconnections) are totally independent, the only solution is
that a third, true Substance (God) continuously coordinates and medi-
ates between the two, sustaining the semblance of continuity: when I
think about raising my hand and my hand effectively raises, my thought
causes the raising of my hand not directly but only "occasionally"-
upon noticing my thought directed at raising my hand, God sets in
motion the other, material, causal chain which leads to my hand effec-
tively being raised."
ZiZek immediately proposes the similarity between Occasionalism and
Jacques Lacan's psychoanalytic theory of subjectivity by suggesting we
"replace 'God' with the big Other, the symbolic order,"> Like the Occasion-
alist God, this big Other always interposes itself between the network of
mental processes in the subject and the experience of external, material phe-
nomena. The symbolic order, acquired in and through the acquisition oflan-
guage by the "speaking subject," provides the means for representing and
making sense of the external, meaningless "real" as the subject's "reality."
Just as the God of Occasionalism is not visible to the ordinary perception of
the world, the symbolic order imperceptibly provides the field in which the
subject perceives both the outside world and its own identity vis-a-vis the
outside.
Extending the parallel between Malebranche's God and the symbolic
order, ZiZek contrasts our "commonplace intuition" about the direct linkage
between body and mind with the "far more insightful premise" informing
the actions of the "ancient Aztec priest who organizes human sacrifices to
ensure that the sun will rise again: the human sacrifice is here an appeal to
God to sustain the coordination between the two series, the bodily necessity
and the concatenation of symbolic events."27
Malebranche's God (figuring Lacan's big Other) is like a Programmable
Logic Controller that never malfunctions, or rather, "He" is like the tech-
nician who is always there to guarantee (invisibly) that normal operations
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will in any event continue. Alluding to the central role of the "Name of
the Father" as principal regulative instance in the symbolic realm acquired
through language, Zizek calls Him "the Master." In another text Zizek, fol-
lowing Lacan, characterizes the symbolic order as a "mechanism" of "sense-
less, idiotic automatism," terms which immediately recall our earlier discus-
sion of interactive liberty's evil other, narrative prescription as automation."
We can say that in Lacanian terms narrative represents a key modality of the
symbolic ordering of events and experiences which would produce meaning
(normative, patriarchal, logocentric) through an operation which was itself
meaningless and idiotic because mechanical and automatic.
The Master, then, is like an almost perfect computer operating system
that almost never crashes. This minimal potential for the breakdown of the
coordination of material processes and their symbolic, functional ordering
signalled by "almost never" reflects a crucial element in the Lacanian theory
of the constitution of the subject's reality, whereby a "void" or "hole" is
immanent in the reality produced by the symbolic. This ever-present "void,"
a piece or remainder of the "real" in the subject's reality retains the poten-
tial to destabilize the functioning of the big Other and reveal that our "social
reality is nothing but a fragile, symbolic cobweb that can at any moment
be tom aside by an intrusion of the real,"> Despite or, rather, because of
this ever-present void, the Master ensures- from an unseen, unnoted back-
ground-the regular appearance of reality's unfolding of events in predict-
able and meaningful sequences." As such, the Master guarantees the experi-
ence and significance of reality.
According to ZiZek, Virtual Reality technology enacts an occasionalist
state of affairs in which the redundancy of the role of the Master in the ordi-
nary course of events is both mirrored and made more explicit. As Zizek
states:
When I raise my hand in order to push an object in the virtual space,
this object effectively moves-my illusion, of course, is that it was the
movement of my hand which directly caused the dislocation of the
object, i.e., in my immersion, I overlook the intricate mechanism of
computerized coordination, homologous to the role of God guarantee-
ing the coordination between the two series in occasionalism."
While the ease with which the "intricate mechanism" of the Virtual Reality
illusion is overlooked repeats the forgetting of the Master function in actual
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reality, at the same time this very repetition becomes apparent to the subject
aware of his or her immersion. Zizek's more general point about computer
interactivity is that its constant induction of the user into this contradic-
tory position of both forgetting and being made aware of the function of the
Master brings it to a certain crisis and threatens to undermine it. He locates
the heart of this crisis in the incitement to mastery underlying the promo-
tion and practice of computer-mediated interactivity. To illustrate this claim
ZiZek uses the "classic" contrast between narrative and interactive modes of
cultural text. In a passage of direct relevance to our discussion of the Blade
Runner game, he describes the "structural impasse of so-called 'interactive
storytelling' in which. at every tum of the story, the reader is free to select his
or her own version of the events .... "32 This situation produces. he argues,
a double discontent in the reader: (I) there is "too much freedom," too
much depends on me, instead of yielding to the pleasures of the nar-
rative, I am bombarded with decisions to be made; (2) my naive faith
in diegetic reality is disturbed, i.e., to the horror of the official ideology
of interactive story-telling, I read a story in order to learn what "really"
happened to the hero (did he "really" win over the coveted lady, etc.),
not in order to decide about the outcome."
The "official ideology" of interactive storytelling promotes a vision of a
reader become teller. It reflects at the level of narrative textual engagement
what we have been describing as the incitement to mastery made explicit in
Papert's promotion of a new mode of child interaction with the computer.
Raymond Bellour, in "The Double Helix," characterizes interactivity in a
similar fashion to Zizek as "throwing the spectator out of his allotted seat
and bringing him [sic] in as an actor, producer, and coproducer of a poten-
tiality." 34 This forcible enlisting of the hitherto deemed "passive" spectator
is also linked by Bellour to a passage beyond the traditional mode of image
reception in Western culture, a mode that "from Brunelleschi to video, as the
last panoptic eye, has concentrated the power to make images around a god
who has become more and more absent but always has remained invisibly
fruitful." 3S
Interactivity's promotion of the user as master, then, threatens to depose
this god who, like the disappearing god of Malebranche, is less and less
necessary in the Cartesian rationalist universe, almost redundant in the
humanist cosmos of European modernity in which "man" becomes subject
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of history and agent of representation. This god's invisible fruitfulness is
challenged by interactivity's violation of a "rule" implicit in narrative form,
a rule which is crucial, argues Zizek, to the role that narrative plays in con-
structing and affirming our sense of reality and all that is consequent on that
sense, the sense we make of things. How does Zizek formulate this rule?
"Master's main role," he says, "is to state the obvious"> When we follow a
story, we know it has a determined ending. Why then, would we watch a
story that we've already seen? We know what will happen, but we are fre-
quently surprised, or anxious, or happy all over again. It is, says Zizek, "as
if, at another level, we were not quite sure that the inevitable would happen
again .... "37 The Master's function is to close this temporal gap between
what should and what will happen. In doing so the Master guarantees one
more time the normal sequential order of things, their logical connection
and continuity, and thus the apparent inevitability of spatiotemporal reality
as it is perceived, lived, and remembered.
The concerted effort of the "official ideology" of interactivity-to pro-
mote mastery over the computer, to achieve computational liberation from
servitude in traditional forms of cultural production, to become active
users rather than passive spectators-undermines the Master. Zizek con-
cludes his discussion in "Virtualization of the Master" by warning of the
"unpredictable and uncanny" consequences of this." In The Plague of Fan-
tasies ZiZek discusses cyberspace and the rhetoric of liberation surrounding
online forms of communication and community in a similar vein. He claims
that "the decline of the function of the Master in contemporary Western
societies exposes the subject to radical ambiguity in the face of his desire,'?"
The subject faces, that is, the void of the real (the meaningless externality
that is mediated via the symbolic order in the construction of a meaningful
reality) in this suspension of symbolic mastery, whose main function "is to
tell the subject what he wants - the need for the Master arises in answer to
the subject's confusion, insofar as he does not know what he wants,":" Here
ZiZek delivers a critique of the ideology of "cyber-liberation" by positing the
essential role the symbolic order plays as a constraint against which the sub-
ject can struggle to achieve its desires and exercise its freedom. By insisting
that the subject choose everything, invent him- or herself from a total avail-
ability of possibilities, communicate and interact with anyone or anything
at all, cyber-liberation suspends the operation of the (symbolic) Master with
unexpected results:
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The vision of cyberspace opening up a future of unending possibilities
oflirnitless change, of new multiple sex organs, and so on, conceals its
exact opposite: an unheard-of imposition of radical closure. This, then,
is the Real awaiting us, and all endeavours to symbolise this Real, from
utopian (the New Age or "deconstructionist" celebrations of the liber-
ating potentials of cyberspace) to the blackest dystopian ones (the pros-
pect of the total control by a God-like computerized network ... ) are just
that: so many attempts to avoid the true "end of history," the paradox
of an infinity far more suffocating than any actual confinement."
While I would concur with Zizek's critique of a total cyber-liberation from
the Master, I would like to return to the Blade Runner game here in order
to speculate on the "uncanny" nature of its partial destabilization of the
Master. As outlined earlier, key aspects of the game indicate the incom-
plete nature of its fulfilment of the "official ideology" of interactivity. For
instance, while the player can control the narrative sequence and alter the
outcome of the game's story through the game play, there are certain cru-
cial sequences in the game in which "cut-scene animations" take place like
movie segments during which the player can only sit back and watch. These
sequences are key transitional phases in the game's overall structure into
acts and they correspond with new scenes being loaded onto the computer's
RAM from disk. These transitional sequences are a necessary convention in
adventure and role-play games (such as the Tomb Raider series, Metal Gear
Solid, and the Resident Evil series), which stage their action in a number of
different fictive spaces.
Narrative structure in the form of scene setting motivated by at least per-
functory causal explanation-and commonly by a more substantial invest-
ment in classical narrative features such as character development, relation-
ships with supporting cast, and provision of backs tory - is then a somewhat
inescapable fact of the genre of the interactive adventure game. The Blade
Runner game is no exception to this. Transitions between acts involve inter-
actions with other characters that both advance the game's scenario and
reveal other information about McCoy's character and his past or present
associations with other characters. These sequences vary according to the
order in which the gamer has discovered things and accomplished tasks, but
also according to the nature of the strategy she or he has adopted vis-a-vis
the replicants, namely, whether to playas a "sympathizer" or as a straight
"repdetective" intent on retiring all the replicants McCoy comes across. This
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basic strategic decision has a number of alternatives that are combinations
or complications of the simple choice between two absolute positions. In
a way that exemplifies the standardization of computer-mediated interac-
tivity described by Manovich, the Blade Runner game provides a range of
narrativizations of the game experience that are flexible but drawn from a
set of predesigned alternatives.
The Blade Runner game, like all adventure games, is not a pure inter-
active experience. As such, it does not effect the complete suspension of the
Master function, the consequences of which ZiZek theorizes. It constrains
the gamer by provision of a structure of options for playing the game that
delimits his or her goals, strategies, and tactics for achieving those goals.
Nevertheless, it has in common with other adventure games and indeed
with new media forms in general that it forces the interactor to make a
choice at every stage. In doing so, it enacts the incitement to interactive
mastery even within this hybrid form still overshadowed by the narrative
automaton.
The gamer's relation to the McCoycharacter-avatar mirrors this hybridity
of narrative and interactivity. Game settings allow you to have a limited
degree of control over his verbal interactions with other characters-the
user can select from a menu of responses and topics of inquiry-or McCoy
can be set to respond automatically in one of three registers: polite, neu-
tral, or surly." As I stated earlier in this essay, the player can alter McCoy's
identity between human and replicant from game to game by regulating his
behavior toward the other characters. One is limited, however, to the white
male "envelope" of the stereotypical noir detective."
McCoy is an uncanny double of the game player. Like all doubles, he
both resembles and differs from the original he duplicates. Familiar but
strange, he is seen in third-person view, but he is the gamer's double. In
many respects the game is about the problem of "determining" who McCoy
is-the problem being, above all, a problem of deciding whether "to deter-
mine" means "to find out once and for all" or "to make or create" (as in
"self-determination"). But this is an uncanny project that rebounds on the
gamer in the era of interactivity when everything must be decided by the
subject-master forwhom it is no longer possible to "state the obvious" about
something so fundamental as, say,one's own identity.
That this most obvious something cannot be readily asserted recalls the
familiar psychoanalytic and philosophical scenario of the subject's strange-
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ness to itself, a scenario thematized in the Blade Runner film through the
affinity posited between replicant and human as objects of manipulation,
artifice and prostheticized experience. In this regard, the relation of McCoy
to the gamer who plays through him corresponds also to the relation of the
game to the film. The game is an uncanny double of the film, familiar yet
strange. It is like the film in that, as Scott Bukatman has shown, the film
provides a sustained encounter with "the metropolitan world" but "under-
determines the lessons of that encounter, it effectively undermines inter-
pretative certitudes."44The Blade Runner game works in this thematic ter-
rain as well, but its strangeness lies in its extension of this process across
media forms from cinematic narrative to interactive computer game. The
uncertain spectator is now the unconvinced interactor-both master and
automaton of the game's progress and prerogatives. It is in the play that
exists between these putatively fixed poles (mastery of the Blade Runner
universe versus a reiterated entrapment within it) that at one level the gamer
plays when inside the compelling recreation of the extraordinary diegesis
of the Blade Runner film. This playwith and between narrative and interac-
tivity is ostensibly a double or nothing bet but the dividend may be neither.
To put it another way, the uncanny outcome of the promise of interactivity
to arrive at the one who is both subject and master of the computational cul-
ture may be the advent of one who is neither-an advent that would also be
the return of something familiar.
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